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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent

-vSTEVEN V. SINGLETON

Case No.

19107

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, STEVEN V. SINGLETON, appeals from his
conviction of Theft, a Third Degree felony in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following trial by jury, the Court entered judgment
of guilty of Count II of the Information, Theft, a Third Degree
Felony and not guilty of Count I of the Information, Burglary,
a Second Degree Felony.

Defendant was ordered col!Ul1itted to the

Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term not to exceed five
years and was fined Five Hundred ($500) Dollars.

Defendant was

granted a stay of execution of the above sentence and was placed
on probation for a period of three years under the supervision
of Adult Probation and Parole.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the lower court's conv.i ct ion
reversed and to have the case remanded to the Third District
Court for a new trial or have the matter dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 11, 1981, at about 7:15 p.m., witness
Bailey was turning into her driveway when out of the corner
of her eye, she saw movement west of her in an adjacent fieldo
(T. 30).

As she proceeded into the driveway, her lights flashed

on a person who walked past her car.

(T. 37).

hit on something shiney in the field.

Her lights also

(T. 40).

Bailey continued

to watch the individual from her rearview mirror and when she was
sure he wasn't around, she went into the area of the field where
she had seen the object shine and found a stereoo

(T. 41)

then returned to her apartment and called the police<

0

She

(T. 41)

0

When the police arrived, they discovered a residence
at 365 North Main had been burglarized.

(T. 90).

Besides the

stereo equipment discovered by Bailey, a thirty-five millimeter
camera, hard case, and telephoto lens had been taken from the
residence.

(T. 27).

The camera equipment was never found<

Bailey told the investigating officer that the individual
she had seen was male white in his 20's, about five foot eight or
ten, medium build, wearing a blue and white baseball cap, a blue
jacket, and levis.

(T. 93).

The investigating officer called

two motor officers in the area and gave them the description.
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sometime around 9:00 p.m.

(T. 42)

the motor officers saw the

appellant at about 603 North 200 West wearing levis, a blue
nylon jacket and a blue and white baseball cap.

(T.

123).

After asking for and receiving Appellant's identification,
(T. 128) the motor officers took Appellant to the Bailey residence
for a "show up".

The officers took the hand-cuffed Appellant

across the street to stand under a street light, and from her
porch steps Bailey identified him as the individual she had seen
earlier in the evening.

(T.

78-82).

While en-route to the jail, Appellant stated to the
transporting officer "I guess she saw me with the stereo
equipment, too?".
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PROSECUTOR'S SOLICITATION OF TESTIMONY FROM
POLICE OFFICER AS TO APPELLANT'S SILENCE AFTER
RECEIVING THE MIRANDA WARNING VIOLATES APPELLANT'S
FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
During trial, counsel for the State called Douglas Maack,
a Salt Lake City Police officer to the stand.
then elicited the following testimony:

The prosecutor

(T. 97-100).

Q.

After she made her identification of the
individual, what did you do?

A.
I placed the individual back in my car and
read him his rights.
Q.

What rights did you read?

A:

Miranda.

Q.
Did you read that from a card, or personally,
or what?

A.

From a card.

Q.

Did he indicate that he understood his riqhts?

A.

Yes sir, he did.

Q.

For the record, do you have the card with you?

A.

No, sir, I don't.

Q. Can you remember what the card said, what the
rights are that you gave?
A.

I always read it directly from a card.

Q.

Is that a standard-practice procedure card?

A.

Yes, sir, it is.

Q. After reading that, did you ask him if he
understood his rights?
A.

Yes, sir, I did.

Q.

Did he respond?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What did he say?

A.
I can describe the card a little bit.
Miranda
is on the one side, and you turn it over and on the
other side it asks if those are -- if they completely
understand the Miranda that they have been given and
if they wish to make a statement or talk to an
attorney.

Q.

Did he respond to that question?

A.

He responded to both.

Q.

What did he say?

A.
He said he understood his rights and he said
he really didn't have anything to say.
MR. EBERT:
motion.

Your Honor, I object and I reserve a

THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.
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MR. EBERT:
right now.

Your Honor, I would ask to argue this

THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. EBERT: Your Honor, I would like to argue it
outside the presence of the jury.
THE COURT:

You will have an opportunity to do that.

You may proceed with your questioning.
MR. GUNNARSON:

Thank you.

Q.
(By Mr. Gunnarson)
want to talk to you?

Did he indicate he didn't

A.

At that time he did, yes.

Q.

What exactly did he say?

A.
Something to the effect that he didn't have
anything to say.
Q.
Did he say he had nothing to say, or that he
didn't want to talk to you?
A.

Just that he didn't have anything to say.

Appellant maintains that allowing testimony relating to
the Appellant's exercise of his Constitutional right to remain
silent was improper and prejudicial to the jury.

Such improper

conduct on the part of the State should entitle the Appellant to
a new trial before a jury untainted by such prejudicial information.
An

accused in a criminal trial has the privilege against

self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

The privilege

is safeguarded in a police custodial interrogation by the mandate
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 431 (1966).
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The accused, in

exercise of the right against self-1ncr1m1nation, may remain
silent and refuse to talk to police.

An accused's silence

may not later be used against him as evidence of his guilt.
Id.

at 384 U.S. 468, fn. 37.

The

United States Supreme Court

has extended this principle to include questioning and comment
on a defendant's failure to make a statement upon arrest,
after Miranda warnings have been given.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 UoS.

619 (1976).
The policies to be served by a rule against prosecutorial
comment on the accused's exercise of his right to remain silent
have been recognized by the Utah Supreme court.

In State v.

Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (1981), this Court reversed the defendant's
conviction on the basis that the prosecution attempted, more than
once, to put the defendant's post-arrest silence before the jury.
This court stated that references to Wiswell's post-arrest silence
were "fundamental error which could have affected the result and
[were] therefore prejudicial."
In the present case, counsel objected to testimony
that appellant remained silent after Miranda warnings.

The

objection was overruled and a subsequent defense motion for a
mistrial was denied.

By overruling counsel's objection, the trial

court may have given the jury the impression that they could
lawfully infer guilt from the Appellant's exercise of his Fifth
Amendment privilege.
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Further, testimony that the Appellant "had nothing to
say" to police after Miranda was of no relevance or probative value
to the substance of the State's case.

The only possible purpose

of allowing such testimony to reach the jury was to prejudice the
accused and infer his guilt.cf. State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326
(Utah 1980).
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF
THE APPELLANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
It is well settled that a reviewing court has
the authority to review a conviction based upon sufficiency
of the evidence.

The standard for review was clearly stated in

State v. Wilson, 565 P. 2d 66 (1977):
In order for the defendant to successfully
challenge and overturn a verdict on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence,
it must appear that upon so viewing the
evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily
entertain a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime . .565 P.2d 68,
See Also State v. Forte, 572 P.2d 1387.
In State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975), this court
also addressed when sufficiency of the evidence must be challenged:
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
his conviction, it must appear that viewing
the evidence and all inferences that may
reasonably be drawn therefrom, in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury,
reasonable minds could not believe him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
530 P.2d at
127 2.
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In the present case, Appellant maintains the evidence
presented by the State was insufficient to support a verdict of
guilt of Theft beyond a reasonable doubt.
The identification of Appellant as the man Bailey saw
next to stereo equipment in the field was based upon a 15 to
20 second observation which occurred at night.

(T.

59).

The description Bailey gave to the police was a general
one which presumably could have fit a number of young men on the
streets in November; male in his 20's, dressed in levis and
levi jacket with a blue and white baseball cap.

(T.

93).

Further, Bailey's identification of Appellant nearly two hours
later occurs while the accused was in police custody, handcuffed
and with the illumination of only a street light.

(T. 78-82).

Such circumstances should have created doubt that Bailey's
identification was a valid one.
Even if the jury could have believed beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant was the individual Bailey saw
next to the property in the field, the State presented no evidence
that Appellant was the individual who had stolen the property.
The mere presence of an individual at the scene of a crime, should
not be sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
That the jury split its verdict and found appellant not
guilty of the Burglary but guilty of the Theft cannot be overlooked.

There was no evidence that the Appellant had the requisite

intent to commit a theft, unless the jury believed not only that
-8-

Appellant was the man Bailey saw near the stereo equipment,
but that Appellant was also the burglar who had taken the property
from the victim residence.

The jury's acquittal of the underlying

burglary charge indicates the probability that the jury was not
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt and
instead of acquitting, split the
Appellant respectfully submits that the State failed to
establish his guilt of the crime of Theft beyond a reasonable
doubt and asks that his conviction be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error in
allowing Appellant's post-arrest silence to be brought into
evidence.

Further, evidence presented by the State was

insufficient to establish the Appellant's guilt of Theft beyond
a reasonable doubt.
For these reasons,
conviction be reversed.

(

DATED this

)7... ,->
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DELIVERED two copies of the foreqoinq to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84114, this -.!..3._day of April, 1984.
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